THE CIA AND 1 1l 1S PROPRIEI'ARY NE1l1WORXS

An understanding of the role of the CIA and of its numerous
proprietary companies can not be obt a ined fro m/ ' a simple
study of those proprietaries alone.

I

'I'he CJ A' s proprte-

taries are deeply involved with the Department of Defense.
They are involved ·with other departments of the Government
and they are involved with many other governments.
In some cases the relationship is very complex.

The CIA

may have a military unit which is a cover unit and that
unit may deal with a proprietary which in tyrn will deal
w.i. th some legitimate company.

The legitimate compa..riy

will think that it is dealing with a private firm or with

the DOD directly where a military contract is involved ••
In another c ase a CIA proprietary may gain a contract from
the DOD and will utilize that contract to service the military and at the same trirn e to service other companies.

In

so doing the private companies will not ¥...n ow that they are
' dearlj.ng with the CIA and not the DOD.
In another case a ,.C IA proprietary may use its CIA conJ1.ec ti on

to get something from the DOD which other companies could
not get, thereby gaining a competitive advantage over the
othe bs.

In so doing this device raay be used-intentionally

or unintentionally-to destroy the competition.
And then in certain re.re cs.ses, but in some mos t importa11t

ca ses , ar1 outs ici e company may leenn that it has been outbid
by a proprietary.

:Lt may learn thtS through its own de-

vices a11d contacts or

i

-c rr;ay

•

acql;~.re

such knowledge from

a lawyer who has had special knowlecige of such activity.
In that case it may inform the DOD that if it does not get
an equal or better contract it will blow the whistle.
This t;ype of

11

National Security" blackmail is most effective.

The outside company will get a contract ai.'1d then may continue to use that kind of blackmail year after year.
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'
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(
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CIA's propri e tary bu siness is very l arge .

Some of its pre-

I

prietaries' activities ar e concealed d eeply within major
companies, which cover for the CIA a nd in return get favors and
inside assist a nce.
study.

This could well be the subject of a co mplete

Even beyond the search into proprietaries the study could

look at what the CIA do e s with the rather large sums of money
which it earns from these p r oprietaries.

The CIA uses a " s treet"

name and buys and sells as other big investors do to manage these
vast funds.
CIA is

11

The street n am e most co mmonly ass ociated with the

Suydam".

Funds of this nature ar e of course not Federal

Firnds and are not subject to the usual controls.

from the sale of proprietaries.

Huge sums arise

We do not know where they go,

nor do we know if the sale means a bona fide separa:tion from the
CIA or just another cover arrangement.
of these f ·unds for

11

'I'he CIA depends upon s ome

1Au...r:idered" money.

Few people h ave ev e r h a d a real opportunity to underst a nd
how the CIA utilizes money.

'J1he CIA .gets "wha t money will buy"

many times without the actual expenditure of fm1ds.
liberal use of the provisions of the National

Econom~y

It ma kes
.Ac.t of

1932 as amended in order to acquire goods and services from other
agencies at no . cost or at nominal cost.

The "horizontal" move-

me nt of money ·wh ere the CIA is involved is a little l-D1own
specialty.
In ord e r to provide some backg::·ound for all of this it may
be well worth while to provide _ some background about the DOD/CIA
relationship and its role within the government, indus try and
foreign affairs.
Bef ore
su~port

1955

the U.S.Air Force had a policy for providing

of the clandestine activities o f the CIA; but it wa s re-

latively info rma l.
In August of

1955

It was ba sed upon a l ette r: cod e d DAF

53.

I was directed by the Director of Plans, Hq

USAF to assemble all pertinent files and records and to draft a
formal set of policy papers for the special support of the cland e stine activity of the CIA.

I had participated in cl andest ine

I

.

certain a ctiviti e s in Saudi Arabia, Ru s sia, Turkey and h ad be en
at the Cairo and Tehe ran Conferences.

During the Korean vla.r

period I was the Comma.,.YJ.der of an Air Transport unit which was
responsible for certain

operation~

throughout South Asia among

them providing support for the CIA in India , Thailand, Vietnam,
.•
.
the Philippines and Okinawa. I had background for th~s
special
work before 1955.
I was able to assemble a rather uoluminous file dating
from 19q6 and 1947 through 1955.

Some of these papers were in

the handwriting of General Vandenberg who had been Chief of Staff
of the Air Force and wh o had been the Director of the Central Intelligence Group before the creation of the CIA.

Other papers

were the original NSCID's dating back to the forties and by far
the most important papers were the Report to President Truman on
the CIA, dated Jan 1,1949,
Jackson and Iiathias Correa.

~ade

by Allen W. Dulles, William H.

I.Jater directives we:;:-e some ~1e

handwriting of President :Cisen..tiower.
One of the most

p~rtinent

of these papers was a long

letter directive signed by the then Secretary of Defense Louis
Jo'hnson, in 1949 which established D@D policy for the operational
and logistics · S"l.lpJJo:ct of. uhe clctl1destine activity of the CIA.
(l~OTE:

This use of words is to differentiate the cla.11destine

s

operations of the CIA from its Intelligence mision
which was
,.
not given this special status.)
Jo~ns o n

The principle point of the

directive was the DOD would do everything poss i ble to

support the CIA but only after it has been

asc~rtained

without

doubt that approval for each project had been 9ranted by the NSC
and then only after ' the CIA had ag r e ed to reimburse the DOD for
all out-of-pocket costs incident to such support.

It also auth-

orized elaborate personnel support of the CIA on an assigned and
attached basis.
lfational policy required that no clandestine operatiL;n
would ever be undertaken which could l/ot be plausibly disclaimed
by the U.S.government in the .event of fai[lure or compromise. As
a result all clandestine operations were designed to be small,
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very clo s ely h e ld and when e v e r pa s sibl e , on e -time.
Needless to s ay, alth ou g h my visible role was to p r ovide
y'l.lli tary support for the clai.Y1.destine operations of the CIA, my
r eal role was to keep the military informed of what was being
done in this rarified atmosphere, its cost and to emphasize this
requirement for the ability to plausibly disclaim any operation
which involved military support----at all times.
With all of this material and with the assistance of
selected officials I was able to prepare a draft for support
activities which was ready for Air Staff coordiBation.

The

report was about 50-60 pages in length and was coded:TAB-6.

It

was coordinated throughout the Air Force in the States and overseas and in addition to each Commanding General one other officer
was designate to handle

v.1 2~s

11

TAB-6 11 matters.

General Thomas D. White

Chieftof Staff of the USAF at that time and my boss was

Gen Richard Lindsay.

.

\-lhen the Air Force policy had been made official, it was

arranged for me to meet with Allen Dulles and his Deputy, General
C.P.Cabell.

They arranged for me to have a very thorough and

continuing briefing on all CIA matters involved.

The CIA was

pl e ased with this policy a nd Vir Dulles suggested that there be
a single "Focal Point 11 office on the Air Staff.

This was my .

office and I was its chief from 1955 throu gh 1960.
In

1976

Allen Dulles arranged for me to travel around the

world to visit a con sid e rabl,e number of his overs e as offices in
the company of one of his officials.

Tbis was my first official

visit to a number of these places and I went back to many of them
during the next eight years.
In 1960, at the request of the Secretary of Defense, Thomas
Gates I was transferred from the Air Force to the Office of Special Operations.

This senior office was responsible for all

contact between the CIA and DOD, among other things.

At that

level I performed much the same duties and functions there as I
had done in the Air Force only then it was for all services.

After the Kennedy inauguration I continued to work in the office
of the Secretary of Defense, Bob McNamara for about a year t!ntil
General Earle Wheeler, who was then the Director of the Joint
Staff suggested that the military support of the CIA might best
be placed on the Joint Staff level.

This request was granted and

in 1962 I was transferred to the Joint Staff and provided with
a Navy and Army counterpart along with secretarial assista_nce.
My first duty there was to draw up a Joint Staff policy
paper very much like the one which I had created for the Air

li Force.
II 021d

This was done and it was approved by the Chiefs of Staff

officially

11

Red Striped'".

An office similar to mine in the

JciDt Staff waps established in most major commands overseas and
in t;he Army, Navy and Air Force.
In the nine years which this period spanned many of the
things which have now become quite well known as

11

CIA ac ti vi ties'j

me2.J1ing cla11destine operatio,n s rather than intelligence chores,
took place.

For example, the very first meeting which I attended

:I

with CIA officials in 1955 involved the origins of the vast P2V-7

:

program which became a world wide ELINT, radar and surveillance
'
project.

The Indonesian project, Tibetan programs, the Bay of

Figs program and many other-s all - got their first . military support
from my office.

Gradually a system developed which resulted in

the DOD being--in effect--a proprietary partner of the CIA.
;

.My

office processed and supported the assignment or attach-

ment of thousands of military personnel to the agency and in
support of the agency.

It established and supported more than

one thousand military cover units which were created for the sole
purpose of providing 'cover for the CTA.
This became a particularly impottant acJivity.

For example

private companies which did business with these "military" units
thought they

~ere

dealing with the military when in reality they

were dealing with the CIA.

In some cases this led to major con-

tracts and in certain cases these contracts were let without the
custorrary and required bidding or amending procedures normal to
the DOD system.

Of course, in keeping with the old directive pro-

mulgated by Sec Johnson and up-dated thereafter, the military

:

6
sought reimbursement for all funds expended.

But in some ca se s

due to security precautions they did not know what had taken
.Place and in others they could not take action with out exposing the CIA.

Some competitive, non-proprietary companies

learned about this system ru1d took advantage of it.
this quiet undercover relationship for leverage.

They used

As small com-

panies learned this, larger ones did and this got to be quite
widespread and led to a most unique method of procurement.
In another twist of this process the CIA would put its
own agents into "military" units and in some cases would have
them recalled to active duty so that they could serve in uniform
with rank.

Then the CIA would ask the Defense Dept to reassign

these people to other jobs with other federal departments and
agenC.~es or even out into industry.

Obviously the gaining org-

anization did not know that the DOD was serving as a proprietary
of the CIA.

This led to many complicated situations especially
(

when a CIA agent, wearing the uniform of the armed forces was
gi;en a responsible job in the

FP~~ o~

other such policy making

organization.
This got even more deep-rooted after the original "deep
co\ter" assignee was replaced and another tookhis place. · By that
time no one would know that the original "slot' had been created
for the CIA and the new incumbent would be completely unidentifiable to anyone as a CIA a.ge nt.

This required elaborate money arrangements which my office
was responsible for arranging.

The salary such persons drew from

the nili tary would be blanked and the man v;ould turn in his
military che ck.

Re would be paid by the CIA and the military

would be reimbursed--on paper to keep the record clear.

Then it

became more complicated when the individual would travel on
~iiitary

orders and incur expenses against the DOD all over the
L

world.
In maay cases we would keep three files: the individual's,
his CIA file and his military file.

We would do our best to keep

them all up to date and to plug the holes.

7
With all this activity it was inevitable that my office
would become increasingly involved in the CIA proprietary program.

We handled hundreds of contl'acts with companies of all

kinds, with aircraft companies, with air lines, with maintenance
organizations, with brokers and universities, with sub-contractors

companies under the Pacific Corp and other arrangements.)
Air America is not unknown; yet there are perhaps no more
than two or three people who really J:,_I1ow how extensive what we
shall call

11

Air America" is arid how far reaching its ac ti vi ty.

At one time we had records in my office, and I am sure they were
not compr-ehensive, of more than 100 organizations which were in
some way or other related to Air America.

It may be said that

Air America, in total way one of the largest airlines a.Dd air
support organizations in the world.
;

7

0

!;;

At one time Air America had

base fac£lities in the Far East which had more than 4,000 men

on each one.

· ~an any

other airline say that?

There are Air America affiliates all over the world.
America works in Europe, the Far East a.Dd the Middle East.

Air
Air

America crews and aircraft played a significant role in the Bay
of Pigs program and in such things as the Indonesian a.."'1d Tibetan
proj.ects.
Air America had the capability to maintain aircraft of
all kinds and more than that ' it could make aircraft parts for
most of its own aircraft.

It had the design drawings re-quired

to make all parts of such aircraft as DC-6's.

It could build

complete airc:r·aSt in order that it could create a totally saniti zed airplc..ne with no serial numbers, an;y-where in its entire

structure---not just the tail number, for operational purposes.
c

Air America was an elaborate corporation.
in the world.

The best in its busines

It would surprise this committee to have a listing

8

of how Air America acquired all of its aircraft and th e n for this
/

committ e e to be able to go over that "sanitized" list to find out

i

how Air America actually obtained its aircraft and its other
a s sc~ s.

c a pital

r

~

It is significant to point out that these

f

t

I!

advantages which accrued to Air America gave it an enviable com-

lt'
l

petitive adge in the airline, air maintenance and even in the
manufacturing and sub-component business among its peers.

I
f

There came a time when the Pacific Corporation, Air

~'

America's gilt-edged parent, was being formed that the CIA wanted

!

to regularize and formalize many of its activities.

One of the

,.f

things they were greatly interested in was the process of bidding
for military contracts both airlift and maintenance.

t

!'

The presi-

f

dent of Air America and I worked together for quite a period of
time on the draft of an important letter which was to be signed
by Allen Dulles and addressed to the Secretary of the Air Force

f

I

with . the suggestion that P!ir America be informed of every request
for bid for either airlift or air maintenance contracts and that

I

Air America be carefully considered when such bids were being
awarded.

We were careful, on both sides, to see that the letter

was not a firm commitment and the Air Force was careful to see

if

that no e:xplicit commitment was inferred.

J

preparation the letter was signed by Allen
Dulles a nd delivered to the Secretary via the office of the Deputy A s si st2nt Sec::::· e tary for Civil Aviation. (It should be noted
that the office of that official was Pentagon Room number 4E871
and that the office of the Secretary of the Air Force is also
listed as 4E871.

No other such official had the same room

number as the Secretary.

Actually that room is the office of

the Secretary's r e ceptionist as was physically across the hall

from the Se c retary.
that office

\~· as

It also happened that the incumbent of

an official of the CIA.)

Because I had worked on the

develo p~ent

Il

of this letter I

wa s directed to prepare a reply for the Secretary's signature.
In general the Secre tary agreed with the suggestion ~rom Allen

I

l

'

cin s 1_1 c h contracts.

:1port an t 2irlift c;.nd aircraft rnai nt0n a nce contracts eve n

1n ;:; n;:v

i

at

~im e

q

Air Jme:r·ica ;.rnd other proprietaries rc:cieve:d

when this meant omitting other sma ll carriers from

contracts which they might otherwise have expect e d to win.
With the fulfillm e nt of th es e contracts the CIA

~a s

a ble to make

l::se of suc h flights for its ovm operational purposes and more
importantly to give the appearance that Air Am e rica was a healthy
a nd normal h ard working airline among its competition.
In the Far East t!1is close

::.~elatior.cship blos some~to

the period of the Vietn am War when Air hmerica and its numberless affiliates rece ived tremendous contracts i nv oltlng th e m in

But it was not al way s tha t \-.'ay 2nd on

a ll aspects of t he war.

one conspicuo1Js occasion our letter of agreem e nt with Allen Dulles
caused the hir Force sooe grie f.

During that partic~lar period

airl ift contracts had reache d a low e bb 2nd there were very
.(

~

up for bid in the Far

£2..S i::; •

In spite of thi s hir

A~erica

few

won

This cau sed some bitter complaints f:r:·om the others.

i ".5bid.

One in pa rt icul ar came to the Pentagon and requested a disc uss ion
with the S ecretary .
was to visi t
I\o t

the law offices of a prom in e nt firm acros s
lo ng a fter that they both retlJ.rned and some sort of

was r0ached .

2s~essent

for so=e

Failing s u ccess with that ploy the next st e p

The " Do::-winner" obtained a contrc.c t

2ir~ift .

blac~~ai l,

it

~as

50

goon

]~had

to

~e

re~eat s ~ .

s~ch ~ere

31, 1963 .

staffs.

I·~any

Qf

the i I:!ponderab l e s /ni ch

':;e

a!"·e tryi:::g to u::J.-

per-iod.
It is qu it e futiJe to atte~pt s uch probing around in

10
the qu<;gin 1 1·c

of t r:e t pe:riod) csp e: ci;dly s11;ce it

.,., ~::is

a r ~, ;;~or

part of the p r- of e ss i on to o bfll s co. te every thing e:nd ev e:1·y.·.· r1e;re
as a

matter of expertise.

Me n

~ho

might truthfully

s~ear

th a t

they took part in such and such a mission would be wrong becau s e they would have no i·: ay of kno1·:ing that the part of the
mission they
th~. t

worl~ed

with v.'as only the umbrella po r tion and

t!1e men they trair...ed and launched never wer e intended to

go c.n;y--.,,,here anyhow.

.

Even some who served with military units never b1ew that

th E- l.\" ·uni ts \.:ere really false ar.d they were

s: ~pl;y

rr.e.intaining

helicopters or keeping records for the CIA.
But there is a

al! of these things.

fine de t ail

t~e

'.:.'a;f

to get to a full un8erstan·O.ing of

~he

law of this country spells out in

duties and responsibilities of the CIA.

that is nec es s a ry is to a sk the CIA

~hat

it has done in

with the law--a law ~hich ifu ~lti~ately unco ~ p li c a ted
i~ .:; 2 C.s

it with skill .::nd cc.re.

~

l

All
accorda~ce
,

or or.le 1.-;:·r10

And next it is sir:rnle to a :rrange

with the CIA that it will be funded explicitJy each year to do

c e~ tain things of importance { :~this government and its ~elf2re
2nd t hat

t~ere

will be Boney for those things and nothing else.

'l·:C.:3t is t:he \·:as these thin g s can be operated.

·..'E did' th::::.t in

:.h e :::JO:D for tb ose nine years a..YJ.d we kDew hhat was going OI'-.

L

